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CRYPTANALYSIS OF A PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM 
BASED ON DICKSON-POLYNOMIALS 
RUPERT NOBAUER1 
1. Introduction 
One of the most important public-key cryptosystems (PKC) is undoubtedly 
the RSA-scheme (cf. [14]). In this cryptosystem, the plaintext alphabet and the 
code alphabet are given by Z/(n), the ring of residue classes of the integers Z 
modulo a natural number n, and the family of encryption functions is given by 
the group of power permutations x -+ xk of Z/(n). Variants of the RSA-scheme 
are obtained if the group of power permutations of Z/(n) is replaced by other 
permutation groups of Z/(n) induced by polynomials or rational functions. So 
far, three PKCs of this kind have been proposed. The first one (cf. [3], [10]) is 
based on a class of rational functions which has been introduced by L. Redei in 
[13], and the second and third one (cf. [6]) are based on the so-called Dickson-
polynomials gk(a,x) with parameter a = 1 or a = — 1, respectively. 
The PKC based on the Redei-functions has been cryptanalysed in [8], and a 
cryptanalysis of the PKC based on the Dickson-polynomials with a = 1 can be 
found in [5]. The aim of this paper is to perform a cryptanalysis of the third one 
of the proposed variants of the RSA-scheme. Having outlined the algebraic 
background and having given a short description of the scheme, we discuss 
several possibilities for a cryptanalytic attack, and we formulate requirements 
to the key parameters which guarantee the system to be secure from the 
described attacks. 
2. Algebraic background 
Let a be an integer. The Dickson-polynomial gk(a,x)eZ[x] of degree k is 
given by 
1 The work presented in this paper was supported by the Osterreichische Fonds zur Forderung 
der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung under FWF-Project No. P 5452. 
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where [k/2] denotes the greatest integer t ^ k/2. In Q(y), the field of rational 
functions over the field Q of rational numbers, the following formula holds (cf. 
(12)): 
ft(*, + !)_,. + (£)'. ( 1 ) 
Since for every beQ the equation u + - = b has solutions u,, u2 in a quadratic 
u 
extension field of Q, we obtain: 
gk(a
l,g,(a, b)) = gk [a
1, u[ + [£j ) = u\< + Q = 
= gkl(a,u] +—J = gkl(a,b). (2) 
Therefore, if = denotes the composition of polynomials, the polynomials 
gk(a
!, x) g,(a, x) and gkl(a, x) have the same function values for infinitely many 
numbers beQ, and consequently in Z[x] the functional equation 
gk(a', x) - g,(a, x) = gk,(a, x) (3) 
holds. 
In this paper we restrict ourselves to the case a= — 1, and we write 
gk(-\,x)= gk(x). From (3) we obtain gk(x) ~g,(x) = gk,(x) for odd natural 
numbers k and /. 
In the following we write [a[9...,ar] for the least common multiple and 
(a,, ...,a,) for the greatest common divisor of the integers a,, ...,ar. Let n be a 
r 
natural number with the prime factorization n •• f\ Pi^ and let v(n) be given by 
/ = I 
I'M = [P\l~](P\ ~ \h'",Prr~](Pr- !)]• 
In [11] it is proved that the mapping x -* gk(x) modn is a permutation of Z/(n) 
if and only if (k, v(n)) = 1. 
The set D(n) of all Dickson-permutations x -• gk(x) mod n forms a semigroup 
under composition. Indeed, let the permutations n and Q be induced by gk(x) 
and g,(x). Then n = c? is induced by _f̂ (.v) - _T/(x). In the case n > 2, the number v(r7) 
is even, hence k and / are odd, and therefore we have gk(x) - g^x) = gk,(x). In the 
case r? = 2 we have 1 = — 1, hence gk(x) = gk(— \,x) = gk(\,x), and therefore 
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by (3) again we have gk(x) °gi(x) = gkl(x). Thus we have proved: The permuta-
tion no Q is induced by gki(x). 
As subsemigroup of the full permutation group of Z/(«), the semigroup D(n) 
is regular and finite, and therefore it is even a group. This implies that the inverse 
of a Dickson-permutation neD(ri) is itself a Dickson-permutation geD(n). In 
[4] the following result is proved: If neD(n) is induced by gk(x) and if / is a 
natural number with kl = 1 mod v(n), then n~' is induced by gi(x). Hence, if the 
factorization of n is known, it is easy to compute the inverse of a Dickson-
permutation x-*gk(x) modn. On the other hand, no algorithms are known 
allowing to invert Dickson-permutations x -> gk(x) mod A if the factorization of 
n is unknown. Therefore, exactly like in the RSA-scheme, the trapdoor informa-
tion of PKCs based on Dickson-polynomials is given by the factorization of the 
modulus n of the plaintext alphabet Z/(ri). 
3. A fast evaluation algorithm 
Since messages meZ/(ri) are encrypted by m -• gk(m) mod A, we need a fast 
evaluation algorithm allowing to calculate function values of the Dickson 
polynomials gk(x) mod n. In the following we describe an algorithm of complex-
ity O(ld(k)) (cf. also [9]), where ld(k) is the logarithm dualis of k. 
Given beZ/(n), we want to compute gk(b) modn. For doing this, we have to 
solve 
u - - = b, (4) 
u 
or equivalently 
u"--bu-\= 0, (5) 
in some extension ring of Z/(n). As can be seen easily, the factor ring Rh = 
= Z/(n)[u]/(u2 — bu — 1) is an extension ring of Z/(«), and every element seRh 
can be represented uniquely in the form 
s = axu + a0, a^axeZ/(ri). 
Multiplication in Rh can be implemented by using the formula 
(a!u + a0)(b,u + b0) = (#1*0+ tfo^i + aib,b)u + a0b0 + tfi*.. (6) 
By definition of Rh, the element ueRh is a solution of (5). Since u(u — b) = 1, 
u is always invetible. 
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For the evaluation of gk(b) just calculate the power u
k in the ring Rh by using 
the ''square- and multiply-technique": That is, first compute 
U, U , (it )", ..., 
and then multiply together the appropriate factors, thus finding elements a0, 
a}eZ/(n) with 
uk = axu -F #0. 
Since also satisfies (5), the equation 
u 
- l V -a, 
— ^ L + "o 
u J u 
holds, and therefore by (1) 
gk(b) =gk\u--J = "* + ( J = « i U + J + 2 ^ = ^ + 2^ . 
We summarize our procedure in the following 
Algor i thm 1. 
Inpu t n,k,b. 
Compute tf0,a, eZj(n) with u
k = axu 4- aQ modw
2 — bu — \. 
Comment [use the square- and multiply-technique]. 
Compute gk(b) = axb 4- 2a0 modrz. 
End. 
4. The public-key cryptosystem 
Every participant C of the communication network chooses a positive in-
teger r = rc, r prime powers p-\ and an encryption key k = kc with 
(k,p/'_1(P2 — 1)) = 1 for i=l,2, ...,r. Then C calculates the numbers 
r 
n = nc= n P / \ i>'(i) = [P\'~
](P\ ~ 1)-...,Prr~l(Pr- -)]. a n d computes a de-
/ = i 
cryption key / = /c, that is a natural number / satisfying the linear congruence 
kl= lmodt'(w). (7) 
The public key of C consists of the parameters n and k, and the secret key is 
given by the prime factorization of n and by /. 
If A intends to send the secret message m e Zj(nB) to H, he has to encrypt m 
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by calculating c = gk (m) mod nB, and then he sends c to B. The receiver B 
decrypts c by calculating g,(c) = g,(gkAm) = m m o d ^ . 
5. Cryptanalysis 
Since unlike to B a spy does not know the factorization of nB, he cannot 
compute a decryption key lB in the same way as B does. However, he might try 
to use other methods of decryption, especially to do partial decryption, that is 
to decrypt certain ciphertexts without knowing the decryption key lB. 
In the following we discuss several procedures of partial decryption. We show 
that in some cases these attacks can be used also for factoring n. All discussed 
attacks are analogues to well-known attacks on the RSA-scheme (cf. 
Schnor r [16], S immons and N o r r i s [17], Berkowitz [1], Her les tam 
[2], Rivest [14]). We restrict ourselves to the cryptographically most impor-
tant case, where n is the product of two distinct odd prime numbers, that is 
n = pxp2. We show that the PKC is secure from the described attacks if p, — 1 
(i =1 ,2) contains a large prime factor /?,', if p, + 1 (/ = 1,2) contains a large 
prime factor pf, and if the order of k mod/?; as well as the order of k modp* 
(/ = 1,2) is large. These requirements are fulfilled if, e.g., for / = 1,2 
Pi-\=aiP'h a,<10
5, p;>io80, 





5.1. A t t acks by means of numbers s such tha t gs(c) modn 
sat isf ies a given e q u a t i o n 
5.1.1. Partial decryption 
Let ceZj(ri) be a given ciphertext. Suppose, the cryptanalyst succeeds in 
finding a natural number s such that one of the following three conditions is 
satisfied: 
g,(c)2 = 0modrz, (10a) 
gs(c)
2 = 4modr/, seven (10b) 
gs(cf = -4modrz, s odd. (10c) 
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Let s = :3,52, where s, contains all those prime factors of s which divide k, and 
s2 contains the remaining prime factors. The numbers .v, and s2 can be computed 
without the knowledge of the prime factorization of s by using the following 
A l g o r i t h m 2. 
I n p u t k,s. 
I n i t i a l i z e .v, = 1; s2 = s. 
W h i l e (.v„k) > 1 d o .v, = v,(.s\,k); A\ = — ^ - . 
Cs2,k) 
End . 
Let u,eGF(p,2), / = 1, 2, be solutions of u = c. (Such solutions always 
u 
exist.) If condition (10a) holds, then gs{c)
2 = Omodp, for / = 1 , 2 , hence 
gs(c) = Omod/7,, / = 1,2, and using (1) it fol'ows that in GF(p
2) the equation 
gs(c) = glu, ) = u-+ I ) = 0 holds. This is equivalent to u
2' = 
= —(—l)s, which implies u4s = 1. If condition (10b) holds, then gs(c)' = 
= 4 mod/?, for / = 1,2, hence gs(c)
2 = ( u,v + ( ] J = 4, / - 1,2, and there-
fore u,s H = ± 2 . This is equivalent to (us + 1) = 0, and we obtain u,s = ± 1, 
which implies u,4s = 1. If condition (10c) holds, then gs(c)
2 = — 4 mod/?, for 
/ = 1,2, and since —4 is a square mod/?, iff — 1 is a square mod/7,, it follows that 
Pi = 1 mod 4, / = 1,2. IffeZKp,) is such that f2 EE — 1 mod/?,, we have gs(c) = 
= ±2f. From (1) we obtain gs(c) = u- = ± 2 f in GF(/;,
2), hence 
u,s 
u,2s + 2fu,s — 1 = 0 , therefore (u,v +f)2 = 0, and finally u,s = ±j,, which again 
implies u,4v = 1. 
Thus we have proved: If one of the conditions (10a), (10b) and (10c) is 
fulfilled, and if u,eGF(p2) is a solution of u = c, then there holds z/,4s = V 
u 
and consequently u, V 2 = 1. Let o, be the order of u, in G F (P,2)*, the multiplica-
tive group of GF(p,2). Since (k ,P2 — 1) = 1, we have also (s,,p2 — 1) = 1, and 
since o,|p,2 — 1, there holds 
(*„<>/)= 1. ( ID 
From u,V,V2 = 1 we get o,|4s,^2, hence 0,14^ by (11), and therefore u, 2 = 1. Since 
by assumption p{ is odd, the number p
2 — 1 is even, and from (k,P2 — 1) = 1 we 
obtain (k, 2) = 1. Further, by definition of s2 we have (k,:v2) = 1. Together this 
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yields (k, 4s2) = 1, and consequently there exists an odd natural number k such 
that kk= 1 mod4s2. Suppose that kfc= As2r + \. 
If m = gk~
](c) = gi(c) modrc is the plaintext corresponding to c, then the 
equation m = gt(c) = gi^ \ = u\ + ( j holds in GF(p
2) for i = 1,2. 
Therefore we have 
gnic) = gk-(gk(m)) = g£k(m) = fe \u! + \—J J = 
in GF(p2). By the Chinese remainder theorem we obtain g^(c) = m modrz. 
If we assume that the search of an s such that (10a) or (10b) or (10c) holds 
is done by trial and error, and more concretely by testing all s between 1 and 105, 
we can summarize our attack in the following 
Algor i thm 3 (Deciphering the cryptogram ceZ/(n)). 
Inpu t «, k, c. 
In i t ia l ize s = 0. 
Repeat s = s + 1 unt i l 
gs(c)
2 = 0 mod ft or 
(gs(c)
2 = 4 mod ft and seven) or 
(gs(c)
2 = —4modft and s odd) or 
s> 105. 
If s> 105, then s top; comment [algorithm unsuccessful]. 
Else 
Compute s = S]S2, where sx contains all those prime factors of s which 
divide k, and s2 contains the remaining prime factors of s; 
comment [use algorithm 2]. 
Compute a natural number Ic such that kfc = 1 mod4s2. 
Decipher c by calculating g^(c) = m mod ft. 
Endif. 
End. 
Now we will show that the PKC is secure from attack 5.1.1. if the key 
parameters satisfy (8). In the following let /, 1 = i _ 2, be fixed. We consider the 
Pi equations z = £>, L?eGF(p,), or equivalently, the pt quadratic equations 
z - - ø z - 1 = 0 , ø є G F t ø ) . (12) 
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Each of these equations has two eventually coincident solutions u, veGF(p2). 
Let M, be the set of all those elements of GF(p,2) which are solutions of any of 
the equations (12). If uGGF(p,) and u 4= 0, then u = QEGF(p,) hence 
u 
u G Mj. Now let u G Mj and u ̂  G F (p,). Then u solves one of the equations (12). 
Since <5-> SPi is an automorphism of GF(P,2) that fixes the elements of GF(P ,), 
this equation is also fulfilled by uPi 4- u, and therefore we have uPi = — 1. 
Conversely, if uPi+ = — 1, then u = u + u' = O G G F ( / ? , ) , hence ueM,. 
u 
Thus we have proved (cf. also [12]) 
M, = {ueGF(p'): uPl ' = 1} u [ueGF(p'): uPi+] = - 1 } . 
Let a); be a generator of GF(/?,2)*, and let t, = Oj,(/'' ]~. We have 
/f'+ = (Oj = — 1. Moreover, we define two subgroups K,, L, of GF(/?,2)* 
by K, = {f l )^+ , ) r : r = 0, 1, . . . , / ? , - 2 ) and L,• = {(o)Pl 1 ) s : s = 0, 1, . . . , / ; , } . From 
Ki = {ueGF(p'): u
p'"] = 1} and L, = {ueGF(/7,2): u7'+1 = 1} it follows that 
K. = G F (/?,)* and M, = K,u l,L,. If ue GF (p') solves one of the equations (12), 
then solves this equation, too. With u e K, also e K,, and with u e t;Lj also 
-ie ,Iweh .e„^i, f .do„ ly„V_,l„_or ,= -, 
u u 
in GF(p,2) are given by /• = (o, ' and —f]= (0, ' . The element f] is 
contained in K,ul,L,, iff f solves one of the equations (12), that is iff 
f] — eGF(p). Because of = /,' this is equivalent to 2f]eGF(pl). Since by 
J i J i 
assumption/?, is odd, this holds if and only i f f e G F (/?,), hence if and only if the 
equation z2 = — 1 is solvable in GF(p,), and consequently if and only if 
p, = 1 mod 4. 
If />,.= 1 mod4, then (±f)p'~] = 1 and ( + ff'+] = - 1 , and therefore 
±fieKin tjLf. On the other hand, if ueK,n tLn then u'~ = l a n d u
7 ^ = — 1, 
and therefore u2 = — 1. This implies that for p,-=l'mod4 we have 
K,n lL, = {f, —f}, and for /?, ~ 3 mod4 we have K,n t{L( = { j . 
So far we have proved: For /?, = 1 mod 4, Q ̂  ± 2/,, and for pt = 3 mod 4, the 
equations (12) have exactly two solutions u, eGf(p,2), which are either both 
u 
elements of K, or of l,L,. For pl ~ 1 mod4, g = ±2fh these equations have 
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exactly one solution in GF(p,2), namely u =j] or u = —f] respectively, and this 
solution is an element of K,n l,L,, 
We introduce another subgroup of GF(p2)* by Rf = LfUt/L,-. Obviously, 
R, = {ueGF(/?,2): uip, + ° = 1} = {co'^' ,)/2: r = 0, 1,..., 2Pi + 1}. The groups K„ 
L, and Rt are cyclic, and by (8), the orders of these groups are given by 
|K,| = Pi - 1 = aiPh |L,| = A + 1 = £,P* and by |/y = 2|L,| = 2biP*. If ueK„ 
then ord(u) = 4. 10
5 holds if and only if ord(w)|a,. If d|a„ then the number of 
elements weK, with ord(u) = d is given by <p(d), and therefore the number of 
elements weK, with ord(u) = 4-10
5 is given by ]T] <p(d) = a,. Thus we have 
d\a( 
proved 
|{uGK,: ord(u) = 4-10
5}| = fl/. (13) 
Similarly, we obtain |{WG/,L;: ord(w) = 4-10
5}| = \{ueRt: ord(w) = 4-10
5}| -
- |{WGL,: ord(w) = 4-10
5}| = 2b, - bh and therefore 
|{uEf,_;: ord(u) = 4-10
5}| = b,, (14) 
For a given ciphertext ceZ/(n), algorithm 3 is successful if and only if there 
exists an s with 1 _ s _ 105 such that one of the conditions (10a), (1 Ob) and (10c) 
is satisfied. For i = 1, 2, let w,GK,u l,L, be a solution of z = c. We have 
proved above that each of the conditions (10a), (10b) and (10c) implies ufs = 1, 
i = l , 2 . Hence, if there exists an s with 1 = s ^ 10
5 such that (10a), (10b) or 
(10c) holds, then ord(i/,) = 4-10
5. From what we have proved about the solu-
tions of z = c in GF(p,2), i = 1, 2, and from (13) and (14) it follows that 
z 
\{ceZ/(n): 3s with 1 ̂  s ^ 105 such /ha/ one of the conditions 
(10a), (10b) and (10c) w satisfied}\ = 
= f l | " { " e ^ : ord(u) = 4-10
5} + - {ae/jL,: ord(w) = 4 -10
5 } | = 
/= i l_2 | 2 IJ 
=^n(«/+^)<io ,°. 
4 / = i 
Therefore, if condition (8) holds and if c is uniformly distributed on Z/(«), 
then the probability that c can be decrypted by algorithm 3 is bounded by 
1 0 1 0 / 1 0 1 6 0 = J Q - 1 5 0 
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u\ : V ' = 1 , u2 ~ = - 1 
u,v - ' = - 1 , 




11 Î = - 1 , м 2 = - 1 . 
5.1.2. Factoring of n 
A special case of attack 5.1.1. is given if the cryptanalyst succeeds in finding 
an even natural number s with gs(c) = 2 modrz. Frequently, knowing such an s 
not only allows to decipher c\ but also to factorize n. 
For the following considerations we put v2(s) = max{eeN: 2
c\s}. Suppose 
that the cryptanalyst knows an even s such that gs(c) = 2 mod n. For / = 1, 2 let 
UjE C F (pf) be a solution of u = c. Then in G F (p,2) we have u,s H = 2, and 
u u-
therefore u- = 1, / = 1,2. Let j : = max{rt={0, 1,..., v2(s) — 1}: u,
v2r = 1, 
/ = 1,2} = max{re{0, 1, ..., v2(s) — 1}: gs2,(c) = 2 mod A?}. Since the equation 
x2 = 1 has just the two solutions 1 and — 1 in the cyclic group GF(/? 2 )*, / = 1, 
2, one of the following four cases holds: 
(i)j= v2(s)-\ 
(\i)j< v2(s)- 1, 
( i i i ) y < v2(s)- 1, 
( i v ) j < v2(s)- 1, 
Case (i) is equivalent to gs2v2w i(r) = 2 m o d n , case (iv) is equivalent to 
gs/2l+\(c) = —2 modrz, and in these cases our procedure does not provide the 
factorization of n. If case (ii) holds, then gs2l+ i(c) = 2 modp, and 
gs2i+\(c) ==£ 2modp2 , and therefore (gs2i+\(c) — 2,rz) = p , . Similarly, in case (iii) 
there holds (gs/2/+i(c) — 2,n) = p2. 
If we assume that searching for an s such that gs(c) = 2 modrz is done by 
testing all even s between 1 and 105, we can summarize the attack in the 
following 
A l g o r i t h m 4. 
I n p u t AI, c. 
I n i t i a l i z e s = 0. 
100 R e p e a t s = s + 2 u n t i l gs(c) = 2 modrz o r s > 10
5. 
If s>105 s t o p ; c o m m e n t [algorithm unsuccessful] 
C o m p u t e v2(s). 
C o m p u t e j = max{re{0, 1, ..., v2(s) — 1}: gs2r = 2 modrz}. 
If j = v2(s) — 1, then go to 100; c o m m e n t [case (i); test next s]. 
Else if gs2j+\(c) = —2 modrz g o t o 100; c o m m e n t 
[case (iv); test next s]. 
Else c o m p u t e d = (gs/2j+\(c) — 2,n); c o m m e n t 




Since algorithm 4 is successful only with ciphertexts c which can be decrypted 
by algorithm 3, this algorithm does not represent a real threat to our PKC: If 
condition (8) holds and if c is uniformly distributed on Z/(w), then the probabil-
ity that algorithm 4 provides a nontrivial factor of n is bounded by 10"150. 
5.2. F a c t o r i n g by means of fixed po in t s 
Let s be an d natural number, and let c be a fixed point of gs(x) mod" with 
(c2 + 4,rz) = 1. Clearly c is also a fixed point of gs(x) modp, for i = 1,2. Let 
w,eGF(p2) be a solution of w = c, i = l , 2. Then we have 
w 
gtui - -) = w/ - — = ux,- - , hence (uJ
+] + l)(w/" ] - 1) = 0, and therefore 
v \ w,/ w/ w, 
for i = 1, 2 one of the equations uf+} = — 1 and w/~ ] = 1 holds. If for an /, 
1 _ / _ 2, both equations hold, then w2 = —1, hence w, = , therefore 
c = w, = w, + w, = 2w,, and consequently c2 = 4w,2 = — 4 modp,, which 
yields a contradiction to (c2 + 4,rz)= 1. Since s+ 1 and s— 1 are even, 
/ - 1 V + 1 w/+ ' = — 1 is equivalent to w/+ ] + ( J = — 2 hence to g5 + , (c) = 
= —2modp,, and w/" ' = 1 is equivalent to gs_ ,(c) = 2 modp,. If wf
+' = — 1 
and w2"
 ] = 1 or u\" ] = 1 and u2
s+] = — 1, then (gs_,(c) — 2,«)G{p,,p2}, and a 
factor of " is found. However, if u\+ ] = — 1 and w2
 + ] = — 1 or wf"] = 1 and 
w2"
] = 1, then we have found an even number " with gs(c)
2 = 4 mod ", and 
therefore attack 5.1.2. can be applied. 
A special case of this attack is given when s = k. Then c is a fixed point of 
the enciphering polynomial gk(x) mod". 
As there is not known any systematic algorithm for the search of fixed points 
of gs(x) mod", only trial and error methods can be used. Therefore, the Dick-
son-scheme is secure from attack 5.2. if the number fix(",s) of fixed points of 
gs(x) mod" is small. By the Chinese remainder theorem we have fix(",s) = 
2 
= PI fix (p„ s), and from the results proved in [7] it follows that 
i = I 




+ a2{s - ],pi + 1) + a3(s + \,Pi + 1)] - 2a4, 
1 if v2(s + \) < v2(Pi - V) 
0 ifv2(s+\)žv2(p,-\), 
1 //' v 2 ( s - 1)> v2(p,+ 1) 
0 (j v2(s- 1 ) ^ v2(p,+ 1), 
1 / / V2(.9 + I) = V2(p,+ I) 
0 if v2(s + l) ± v2(p, + l), 
1 // v2(s - 1 ) ^ 2 and v2(pi - 1 ) ^ 2 
4 ~ 0 // v2(:5 - 1) < 2 or v2(p, - 1) < 2 
If the key parameters satisfy (8), then 
fix(p,,s)^-[(:5- i ,a , ) (s - i,p;) + ( s+ i,^,)(s+ uP;) + 
2 
+ (5 - l,b,)(s - l,p*) + (s + l,b,)(s + LF*)]. 
Let us write a)(b for "a does not divide 6". If for / = 1,2 
P;^s- i, P;^s+ I, pfXs- I , F*^s+ I, (15) 
then fix (p„ s) ^ 106, and consequently fix (rz, s) ^ 1012. In this case, the probabil-
ity that a uniformly distributed ceZj(ri) is a fixed point of gs(x) modn is 
bounded by 1012/10160 = 10"148, and the task of finding fixed points is computa-
tionally unfeasible. 
Let us assume that the number s itself is chosen according to a uniform 
distribution on M = {1,2, ...,r}, where r is a large positive integer, e.g. r = 10100. 
In the following we write [x] for the greatest integer which is less or equal than 
the real number x. There are exactly —— + - numbers seM such that 
p\ \s — 1, namely the numbers 1, 1 + p,-, 1 + 2p;, ..., 1 + —— \p\. Similarly, 
there are exactly + 1 numbers seM such that p*\s — 1, there are 
L pT J 
exactly numbers se M such that p; | s + 1, and there are exactly 
L P; J L P* J 
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+ 1 , 
and the same inequalities hold also with p*instead of p\. Therefore, an upper 
bound for the number of elements seM with 
p-\s — 1 or p'j\s + 1 or pf\s — 1 or pf\s + 1 
is given by 41 \+ 1 ). Consequently, a lower bound for the probability that 
a uniformly distributed seM satisfies (15) is given by 
___._4V-i---— 1 
1080 // 1080 r 
Therefore, a uniformly distributed se{l,2, ...,r} satisfies (15) almost certainly. 
Altogether we obtain: If the key parameters satisfy (8), then the task of 
finding an seN and a ceZ/(n) such that c is a fixed point of gs(x) modn is 
computationally unfeasible. 
5.3. S u p e r e n c i p h e r i n g 
Let ceZ/(n) be a given ciphertext, and letm = gk~
x(c) modn be the plaintext 
corresponding to c. We consider gk(c), g?(c), gk(c),..., where gk(x) denotes the 
function gk(x) iterated r times. Since Z/(n) is finite, there are two exponents r and 
s such that grk(c) = gk(c) mod/?, and this implies the existence of a positive 
integer t such that gk(c) = c mod A. Applying gk~
](x) modn on both sides yields 
g[~](c) = gk~\c) = m modtf, and the plaintext is obtained. 
Sometimes superenciphering also yields the factorization of n. Indeed, from 
Sk(x) = gk'(x) w e obtain that every c with gk(c) = c modn is a fixed point of 
gk,(x) modtt, and since k* is odd, attack 5.2. can be applied. Superenciphering 
is successful iff there exists a small t — say t ^ 1010 — such that c is a fixed point 
°f gk'(x) m ° d n. Thus the Dickson-scheme is secure from superenciphering if for 
all / ̂  1010 the mapping x-*gki(x) modn has only a small number of fixed 
points. Let us assume that the conditions (8) and (9) are satisfied. Then all / 
between 1 and 1010 fulfill k' -£ ± 1 modp; and k' ^ ± 1 mod/?* Hence fix(/?;, 
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k1) ^ -[(k ' - 1, alP]) + (k' + 1, aiP\) + (W - 1, blPf) + (k' + 1, biPf)] ^ a, + 
2 
+ b, < 106, and therefore fix(r?,k') < 1012. This yields 
\{ceZ/(n): 3t with 1 ^ t ^ 1010 such lhal gAt(c) =
 C mod/7}| ^ 
i o 1 0 
^ X fix(«,ko< 1010 1012 = io2 2. 
t= 1 
Therefore, if the conditions (8) and (9) are fulfilled, then the fraction of 
ciphertexts ceZ/(n) which can be decrypted by superenciphering is bounded by 
1022/10,60= IO"1 3 8. 
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АНАЛИЗ К Р И П Т О С И С Т Е М Ы С НЕТАЙНЫМ КЛЮЧОМ П О С Т Р О Е Н Н О Й 
С ПОМОЩЬЮ П О Л И Н О М О В ДИКСОНА 
КиреП N 6 5 3 и е г 
Р е з ю м е 
В статье с помощью полиномов Диксона строится криптосистема. Обсуждаются различ­
ные атаки против етой системы. Указываются условия на параметры ключа, которые гаран­
тируют устойчивость системы при всех известных атаках. 
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